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In this paper we study the structure of bilateral communicati on 
links as decentrally emerging among individuals. Such structures 
of who communicates with whom can be identified in many 
important contexts, e.g., Trier (2008) visualizes digital communica- 
tion networks like the increasingly popular virtual communities, 
and Hancock and Raeside (2010) analyze communi cation patterns 
in the operation managemen t of a complex service process, and 
they determine important outcome variables such as the extent 
to which value is shared throughout a community and how it is 
distributed (e.g., Granovetter , 2005, Galeotti, 2010 ). Although the 
OR literature has a strong record of optimizing the central design 
of communication networks (e.g., Campbell, 1994; Kelly et al., 
1998), decentrally developing networks have not received much 
attention in this field, exceptions being Baron et al. (2006), Mons- 
uur (2007), and Janssen and Monsuur (2012). We model their for- 
mation as a game-theor etic network formation process in which 
agents face benefits and costs from being connected by a commu- 
nication link and based on these two-sidedly decide on creating and maintaining a link. 3 Using our model, we predict which stable 
commu nication networ ks emerge from the formation process and 
look at their efficiency properties. Hereby, we focus on a combina- 
tion of two importan t aspects common to communica tion networks 
that has not been investigat ed before in the broad literature on stra- 
tegic network formation: link specificity and the distinction between 
social and informa tional value. 
First, our model features link specificity in the sense that the more 
direct connections an individual has to maintain with other individ- 
uals, the less she is able to specify her attention per link. Therefore, 
her value per link for others declines and she also derives less value 
from each link with others (cf. co-author model Jackson and 
Wolinsky , 1996 ). Thus, this feature is a negative network externality 
(e.g., Asvanund et al., 2004 ) and we go beyond the standard assump- 
tion of a fixed cost per link in communi cation networks (e.g., Bala
and Goyal, 2000 ; connections model Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996 ).
We assume that two connected agents contribute to their bilateral 
process of communication value creation according to a standard 
Cobb–Douglas production function with as inputs the amount of 
time invested by each agent in the link. Higher link specificity im- 
plies higher output elasticitie s in each bilateral value production 




4 In contrast, in the co-author setting, which has been the subject of investigation 
in earlier research (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996), each co-author can wr ite
independently as well. 
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link specificity, while constant returns to scale, i.e., both output elas- 
ticities equal to 1/2, reflect low link specificity.
Second, we introduce the important distinction between social
and informationa l value as motivatio ns for bilateral exchange deci- 
sions. This typology was suggested by the virtual community liter- 
ature regarding the question why individuals choose to participate 
in and contribute to such a community as a whole (e.g., Mathwick
et al., 2008 ). Social value is related to the fact that individuals may 
enjoy communi cating with others, for example because they find it 
entertaining or because they feel it enhances their self-worth. 
Informational value refers to the fact that individuals may obtain 
new valuable knowledge from others when they communicate. 
Typically, informat ional value can be transferred relatively easily 
to third parties through indirect links, whereas social value is more 
personal and therefore hardly transferable without creating a di- 
rect link. To understand the relative impact of social and informa- 
tional member orientation, we assume that social value is only 
experienced from direct neighbors and that information al value 
flows via any path consisting of bilateral communicati on links con- 
necting two agents. Thus, the transfera bility of informati onal value is
a positive network externality (e.g., Asvanund et al., 2004 ). Hereby, 
we integrate transferable and nontransfer able value in one model, 
while so far, value transferabili ty was at best incorporate d uni- 
formly for all value (e.g., Bala and Goyal, 2000 ; connections model 
Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996 ).
Consequentl y, we study the interaction of the negative exter- 
nality of link specificity with the positive externality of informa- 
tional value transferability. Positive and negative externaliti es 
have also been combined in one model by for instance Goyal and 
Joshi (2006) and Currarini (2007), but since their analysis was re- 
stricted to externaliti es defined on coalitions rather than precise 
network structure , our topology of emerging networks is new. If 
one reinterprets the production function as the decay factor, our 
approach offers an endogenous explanat ion of decay of transferred 
value. Models with endogenous decay are quite rare in the litera- 
ture and have mostly been studied in the context of one-sided link 
formation, see Bloch and Dutta (2009), Deroian (2009), Feri and 
Meléndez-Jiménez (2009).
We first deal with the case of communi cation having social va- 
lue only (Section 2) in order to isolate the impact of link specificity
on network structure . When link specificity is high, the set of pair- 
wise stable networks is characterized by two simple conditions 
and is shown to contain a wide range of non-stand ard networks, 
including highly connected and ‘‘small world’’ networks , whereas 
previous models for social and economic network formatio n with- 
out agent heteroge neity mostly predicted simple networks like 
stars and wheels. When link specificity is low, particular combina- 
tions of fully connected components are pairwise stable, similar to 
the prediction of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) for the co-author 
context. Next, we deal with the case of communi cation from which 
both social and informat ional value is derived (Section 3) in order 
to illustrate the additional impact of value transferability on struc- 
ture. Under high link specificity, only networks that consist of dis- 
joint line components of two or three agents are shown to be 
pairwise stable. Apparentl y, the combination of high link specific-
ity and even marginal informat ional value transferabili ty has a
strong fragmentizing effect on the emerging pairwise stable net- 
works. Under low link specificity, the opposite effect takes place: 
already with small informational value transferabili ty, only the 
complete network is pairwise stable. 
Section 4 focuses on efficiency propertie s of the wide variety of 
stable networks discussed in the previous two sections. In particu- 
lar, it is found that both the fragmentation under high link specific-
ity and the dense stable networks under low link specificity are 
efficient in their own setting. In Section 5, link specificity values other than 1 and 1/2 are investiga ted by simulations . Especially, 
it is found that 1 and 1/2 are indeed suitable polar cases and that 
for intermediate link specificity values the common tension be- 
tween stability and efficiency (e.g., Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996 )
is re-establi shed. Subsequentl y, Section 6 concludes and offers 
directions for further research. 
2. Nontransfer able social value 
In this section, we present a game-theor etic model for the for- 
mation of communication networks. Although we believe that 
communi cation networks typically combine social and informa- 
tional value aspects, we first deal with the simpler case in which 
only social value is derived from communi cation. This approach al- 
lows us to illustrate the separate impact of link specificity on com- 
municati on structure and to exclude value transferability. 
Link specificity means that the more direct connections an indi- 
vidual has to maintain with other individua ls, the less she is able to 
specify her attention per link. Therefore, her value per link for 
others declines and she also derives less value from each link with 
others (cf. co-author model Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996 ). This ne- 
gative externality of link formation is crucial in our communi cation 
context, since here no benefits arise from individual contributi ons 
as such. The reason is that communicati on is only valuable if it is 
two-sided , thus effort has to be invested by both sender and 
receiver.4 Neverthel ess, negative externaliti es have been largely ig- 
nored in the communica tion network formation literature until 
now. An excepti on are Haller and Sarangi (2005, Section 4.3), who 
touch on this issue in an extension of their model on heterogeneou s
link reliability where the addition of a link endogenou sly renders all 
adjacent links less reliable .
In short, the objective of this section is to develop a model for 
communi cation network formatio n with only social value from 
communi cation. We use the concept of pairwise stability to char- 
acterize the collection of stable communication networks. 
2.1. Model and stability concept 
A communication network is described by (N,g), where
N = {1, . . . ,n}, n P 3, is a community of agents. A direct link gi,j between
agents i and j in this community (i, j 2 N; i – j) is interpreted as a com-
munication relationship between i and j which is established if they
both wish the link; gi,j indicates with a 1 or a 0 whether i is directly
linked to j or not. These relationships are expressed by undirected links:
for any two agents i and j, gi,j = gj,i. By definition, gi,i = 0, as agents do not
establish communication links with themselves. In this community
agents only derive social value from interaction. 
In case of an isolated relationship between two agents, each 
agent experiences social value Vs > 0 as the outcome of their joint 
communi cation production process. However, maintenanc e of 
the communi cation relationship costs effort: investment of both 
agents is needed in order to make the communicati on specific to 
their personal circumstances and hence useful. Accordingly, in case 
of a network where two agents do not form an isolated pair, both 
agents are assumed to divide their effort equally among all their 
relationshi ps, as a result of which, in an extreme case, the potential 
social communicati on value is divided proportional ly by the num- 
ber of links that agents face. However, since agents may have econ- 
omies of scale in coping with several links, the extent of link 
specificity can be less than proportio nal. 
We assume that the contributions of two agents in their bilat- 
eral process of communication value creation are reflected by a
Fig. 1. An equal neighbor degree network. 
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link by the agents as inputs. We assume both output elasticities 
are equal to q 6 1, where q = 1 corresponds to the case of high link 
specificity and q = 1/2 coincides with constant returns to scale and 
results in low link specificity. Therefore, the total payoff for agent i






q if liðgÞ > 0;
0 if liðgÞ ¼ 0;
8<
: ð1Þ
where Ni(g) is the set of agents with whom i has a direct link, agent j
is a neighbor of agent i if j 2 Ni(g), and li(g) = jNi(g)j is the number of 
neighbor s of agent i, which is also referred to as the degree of i.5
For the model thus described we predict which stable networks
emerge by using the concept of pairwise stability (Jackson and Wolin-
sky, 1996), where a network is stable if no single agent can strictly im-
prove her payoff by deleting one of her direct links and no pair of agents
can both weakly improve their payoffs by creating a direct link while at
least one of the two members strictly improves her payoff by doing so.
This solution concept is weak in the sense that it only assumes stability
against deviations of exactly one link (which involves the permission of
two agents in the case of link formation), reflecting a form of myopia.
We will show that pairwise stability already clearly and interestingly
constrains the number of communication networks that are stable.
The study of Nash refinements in the setting of communication net-
works, for instance following the approach of the strongly pairwise sta-
ble set (Belleflamme and Bloch, 2004), as well as the study of farsighted
stability notions in this setting, for instance following the approach of
the pairwise farsightedly stable set (Herings et al., 2009 ) is left for fu- 
ture research. 
In our notation, we have the following definition.
Definition 1 (pairwise stability ). The network g is pairwise stable if 
for all i, j 2 N with gi,j = 1 it holds that 
PiðgÞP Piðg0Þ and PjðgÞP Pjðg0Þ;
where g0 is such that g0i;j ¼ 0 and g0k;‘ ¼ gk;‘ for all {k,‘} – {i, j}, and for 
all i, j 2 N with gi,j = 0 it holds that 
PiðgÞ > Piðg0Þ or PjðgÞ > Pjðg0Þ or ðPiðgÞ ¼ Piðg0Þ and PjðgÞ ¼ Pjðg0ÞÞ;
where g0 is such that g0i;j ¼ 1 and g0k;‘ ¼ gk;‘ for all {k,‘} – {i, j}.2.2. Stable networks under high link specificity
First, we evaluate pairwise stability in communicati on net- 
works under high link specificity, which we obtain by setting 
q = 1. We prove that in this case, the collection of pairwise stable 
networks can be described by two easily verifiable condition s: (i)
they are what we call equal neighbor degree networks, meaning 
that everybody has at least one neighbor and all neighbors of an 
agent have the same degree, and (ii) there is at most a difference 
of one between the degrees of agents in the same component. 
Definition 2 (equal neighbor degree network ). A network g is an 
equal neighbor degree network when it holds for each i 2 N that
li(g) P 1 and for all j,j0 2 Ni(g) that lj(g) = lj0(g).
For equal neighbor degree networks we will denote the own 
degree of an agent i by di and her neighbors’ degree by ei. A path
in g connecting i and j is defined as a sequence of distinct agents 5 For comparison: the payoff function in the co-author model of










if liðgÞ > 0;
0 if liðgÞ ¼ 0:
(
k1, . . . ,km 2 N for whom it holds that gi;k1 ¼ gk1 ;k2 ¼    ¼
gkm1 ;km ¼ gkm ;j ¼ 1. A component c in g is a network among a set 
of agents C # N for whom it holds that for all i, j 2 C, i – j, there ex- 
ists a path in c connecting i and j and ci,j = 1 if and only if gi,j = 1, and 
for any i 2 C and j 2 NnC, gi,j = 0. A network g is a line if it has exactly 
n  1 links and there exists a sequence of distinct agents k1, . . . ,kn
2 N for whom it holds that gk1 ;k2 ¼ gk2 ;k3 ¼    ¼ gkn1 ;kn ¼ 1. A net- 
work g is a star if it has exactly n  1 links and there exists an agent 
j for whom it holds that gj,i = 1 for all i – j. Agent j is called the cen- 
ter agent whereas the other agents are the peripher y agents of the 
star.
Example 1. The network given in Fig. 1 is an equal neighbor 
degree network with di = 2; ei = 4 for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and di = 4; 
ei = 2 for i = 7, 8, 9. 
Propositi on 1 observes that under high link specificity, pairwise 
stable communi cation networks must be equal neighbor degree 
networks where the degree of two agents in the same component 
differs by at most one by interpreti ng an agent’s payoff as a func- 
tion of the harmonic average degree of her neighbors .6
Proposit ion 1. When q = 1, a communication network g is pairwise 
stable if and only if it is an equal neighbor degree network where it 
holds for each pair of agents k, ‘ in the same component that 
jdk  d‘j 6 1: ð2ÞProof. Let the harmonic average degree of the neighbors of an 
























It is now immediate that agent i strictly prefers to delete a link 
with agent j if and only if the degree of agent j is above the har- 
monic average degree of the neighbors of agent i so if and only if 
ljðgÞ > miðgÞ: ð3Þ
Similarly , and observing that the creation of a link with agent j in-
creases the degree of agent j by one, agent i with li(g) P 1 strictly 
prefers to form a link with agent j if and only if 
ljðgÞ þ 1 < miðgÞ: ð4Þ
()) If agent i has no neighbors, then her payoff is zero, so her 
payoff would strictly improve by forming a link with any other 
agent. Any agent weakly decreases the harmonic average degree 
of her neighbors by forming a link with an agent who has no neigh- 
bors. Pairwise stability therefore implies li(g) P 1 for all i 2 N.6 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions to shorten the 
proof of Proposition 1.
Fig. 2. A multiple-component pairwise stable communication network for q = 1. 
Fig. 3. A ‘‘small world’’ pairwise stable communication network for q = 1. 
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degree. We have now shown that g is an equal neighbor degree 
network.
Consider a component of g. If all agents in this component have 
the same degree, we have shown condition (2). Otherwise, using 
that g is an equal neighbor degree network, the agents in the 
component can be partitioned in two groups, where within each 
group all agents have the same degree. We refer to these two 
groups as the groups of low degree and high degree agents, 
respectively . We show now that there are at least two low degree 
agents. Suppose on the contrary that agent i is the only low degree 
agent. All neighbors of i must be high degree agents and must have 
low degree neighbors themselves. Since their is a unique low 
degree agent, the neighbors of i have only one neighbor them- 
selves, so must be low degree agents, a contradictio n. We have 
shown that there are at least two low degree agents in a
component of g.
If the low degree differs two or more from the high degree, and 
since for a low degree agent i it holds that mi(g) equals the high 
degree, two low degree agents would strictly prefer to form a link 
by (4), which would contradic t pairwise stability of g. We have 
shown condition (2).
() In an equal neighbor degree network, agent i does not want 
to delete a link for then her payoff would reduce to zero if di = 1 and 
would remain the same if di > 1. Let i, j be any not directly linked pair 
of agents, and assume without loss of generality that di 6 dj. Since 
ei 6 di + 1 6 dj + 1, it follows by (4) that creating a link with agent j
does not strictly improve the payoffs of agent i and decreases those 
payoffs if one of the inequalities is strict. If all inequalities hold with 
equality, we have ej 6 dj + 1 = di + 1, so creating a link with agent 
idoes not strictly improve the payoffs of agent j. It follows that being 
unlinked is pairwise stable for i and j. h
The following examples illustrate the wide range of networks 
thus proven to be pairwise stable in the social value case. 7 A network 
g is defined as complet e if all agents are connected, so for all i, j 2 N,
i – j, it holds that gi,j = 1. A netwo rk g is a wheel if it has exactly n links
and there exists a sequence of distinct agents k1, . . . , kn 2 N for whom 
gk1 ;k2 ¼ gk2 ;k3 ¼    ¼ gkn1 ;kn ¼ gkn ;k1 ¼ 1. A network g is regular if it con- 
sists of one componen t and for all i, j 2 N it holds that di = dj.
Corollary 1. When q = 1, the complete, wheel, or any regular 
communicati on network is pairwise stable, for it is an equal neighbor 
degree network where it holds for each pair of agents k, ‘ in the single 
component that 7 This is in contrast with the case also including transferable informational value 
(Section 3.2).jdk  d‘j ¼ 0 6 1:Example 2. A communicati on network consisting of multiple 
components that is pairwise stable under q = 1 is given in Fig. 2.
This also exemplifies that pairwise stable networks may contain 
non-regul ar components. 8Example 3. A ‘‘small world’’ is a network with local clusters of 
highly interlinked agents together with agents that link the various 
clusters. As a consequence, although most agents are not directly 
connected , every agent is indirectly linked to every other agent by 
a relatively small number of steps. A regular ‘‘small world’’ commu- 
nication network that is pairwise stable under q = 1 is given in Fig. 3.
Note that the wide set of stable communication networks includes
complex real-life networks (as empirically studied by e.g. Dodds et al.,
2003), whereas previous models for social and economic network
formation mostly predicted simple networks like stars and wheels
(e.g., Bala and Goyal, 2000; Goyal and Vega-Redondo , 2007 ).
If we would add a small exogenous linking cost on top of the 
current payoff function, the set of pairwise stable networks would 
be greatly reduced, and only very fragmented pairwise stable 
communi cation networks would remain, as only in an isolated pair 
the benefits may outweigh this cost. A similar phenomeno n would 
occur if we would introduce some heterogeneity in Vs such that an 
agent would never be indifferent between two links, and would 
always strictly prefer to delete one of them. As we will see in 
Section 3.2, the introduct ion of information al value surprisingly 
has similar fragmenti ng effects. At the same time, if agents would 
experience costs when breaking existing links, for instance caused 
by a status quo bias, the situation where agents maintain many 
links could be quite persistent. 
2.3. Stable networks under low link specificity
In this section we study the case of low link specificity, obtained 
by setting q = 1/2. We show that particular combinations of fully 
connected components are pairwise stable communication net- 
works. This is similar to the prediction for the co-author model 
of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), where a pairwise stable network 
can be partitioned into fully connected components, each of which 
has a different number of members: if mc1 is the number of mem- 
bers of one such component and mc2 is the next largest size, then 
mc1 > ðmc2 Þ
2. We obtain a different condition because of the differ- 
ence in payoff functions (see Section 2.1).
Proposit ion 2. Consider a communication network g consisting of 
fully connected componen ts c1, . . . , ck with mc1 P mc2 P   P mck ,
where mcj is the number of members of cj. When q = 1/2 it holds that g
is pai rw is e st able if an d onl y if mck P 2 and mcj P 4mcjþ1  2, j = 1, . . . ,
k  1.8 Note that for instan ce any complete bipartite compone nt where the sizes of 
the two sets of agents do not differ more than one satisfies the conditions of 
Proposition 1.
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mck P 3 if k = 1. Consider the case k P 2 and suppose mck ¼ 1. A
member of ck1 has payoff Vs, whereas creating a link with the 
unique member of ck leads to payoff 
mck1  1ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi















a term larger than Vs. Since obviously the unique member of ck
wants to link with a member of ck1, we obtain a contradic tion. 
Conseque ntly, it holds that mck P 2.
Consider a component with m members. No member wants to 
delete a link, for the current payoff for such an agent is Vs, whereas 
deleting a link would reduce it to 0 when m equals 2 and to m 2ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
ðm 2Þðm 1Þ
p V s
when m P 3.
Consider two distinct components, let one component have ‘
members and the other m. A player in the ‘-sized component loses 
from establishi ng a link with a member of the m-sized component 




























. By taking squares on both sides, we obtain 
















< 1 1=m. Taking once more squares on both sides 
and rearranging , we find that m > 4‘  2  1/m. Using that m is an 
integer larger than or equal to 2, the last expression is equiva lent 
to m P 4‘  2. h
Notice that, unless n = 7, the collection of pairwise stable net- 
works described in Propositi on 2 contains the pairwise stable net- 
works in the co-author model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). It is 
a subset of the collection of pairwise stable networks under high 
link specificity (q = 1, Section 2.2).
For q = 1/2 we did not find any other pairwise stable communi- 
cation networks. In particular , it is not hard to verify that neither 
regular communication networks with d < n  1 nor the example 
networks in Figs. 2 and 3 are stable when q = 1/2. 
3. Informational as well as social value 
This section introduces the case in which both social and infor- 
mational value is derived from communicati on in networks. Thus, 
we can illustrate the impact of value transferability on communica- 
tion structure in combinati on with the effect of link specificity. Va- 
lue transferability means that value from communicati on is not 
only derived by direct neighbors, but can also be transferred via 
indirect links (cf. Bala and Goyal, 2000 ). More specifically, we make 
a distinction between social and information al value derived from 
communicati on, where only information al value is transferable 
through the network. For example, social value from communica- 
tion between two car enthusiasts only exists for the two commu- 
nication partners, but informat ional value (e.g., from a solution 
to a technical problem) can exist for others in the network. After 
proposing a model for network formation in this setting, the pair- 
wise stable networks are characterized again. We show that the set of stable communication networks is much more limited in range 
than in the purely social value setting (Section 2).3.1. Model 
We consider a communication network (N,g) where on top of 
social value agents also receive information al value from interac- 
tion with other agents. In case of an isolated relationship between 
two agents, each agent experiences informat ional value Vi > 0 as 
the outcome of their joint communicati on production process. 
Again we assume that the contributions of two agents in their 
bilateral process of communicati on value creation are reflected
by a Cobb–Douglas production function with both output elastici- 
ties equal to q, where q = 1 correspond s to high and q = 1/2 to low 
link specificity. Agents are assumed to give relative attention to 
informat ional and social value in the proportions a and 1  a
respectively , where a is assumed to be constant satisfying 
0 6 a 6 1.
Informati onal value is transferred to third parties through indi- 
rect links (paths of links), whereas social value is not transferable. 
This is due to the fact that in the direct communication production 
process of two agents, any of them can use the information al value 
that she acquired during the bilateral communi cation creation 
with other neighbors. Consequentl y, agent j0 experiences not only 





ðlj0ðgÞ  lj1 ðgÞÞ
q ;
which is similar to the social payoff in Eq. (1), but also second-s tep 
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Therefor e, the total payoff for agent i in communicat ion network g


















q if liðgÞ > 0;




where NiðgÞ is the set of agents with whom i has either a direct or an 
indirect link, Pi;jðgÞ is the set of paths between i and j, and p is the 
set of agents on path p betwee n i and j.
For the model thus described we again use the concept of pair- 
wise stability (Jackson and Wolinsky , 1996 ) to predict which com- 
municati on networks are stable. 
Table 1
Pairwise stable communication networks for q = 1 and a > 0. 
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For q = 1 and 0 < a < 1, it is proven that the pairwise stable commu-
nication networks consist of two- and three-agent line components
only.9 First consider the following lemma that the star communication
network becomes unstable with more than three agents. 
Lemma 1. When q = 1 and 0 < a < 1, the star communi cation 
network is pairwise stable if and only if n = 3. Proof. From the star network, it is not beneficial for any of the 
periphery agents to delete her link with the center agent as then 
her payoff will be zero. For the center agent, deleting a link with 
any of the periphery agents will provide her with the same payoff, 
since she is not involved in any indirect links to other agents. 
Periphery agent i does not create a link with another peripher y


































() aV ið4 nÞ þ ð1 aÞV sð3 nÞ
P 0() n 6 3;
where the informa tional payoff elements on the right-ha nd side of 
the first inequality are derived from (a) the center agent, (b) agent i’,
and (c) the other periphery agents consecutive ly. As we assumed 
commun ities of at least three agents, it holds that n = 3. h
Now the main result can be proven by showing that when high 
link specificity is reinforced by value transferabili ty, it is beneficial
for agents in communi cation networks to break cycles and to de- 
lete links with tree branches that are longer than one link. 
Proposition 3. When q = 1 and 0 < a < 1, a communicati on network 
is pairwise stable if and only if it consists of disjoint line components of 
two or three agents. Proof. See Appendix A. h
Table 1 pictures all communicati on networks thus proven to be 
pairwise stable in the case with both social and informational va- 
lue from communi cation and q = 1 for n 6 6. Comparing these re- 
sults to the purely social value case (Section 2.2), clearly a much 
smaller range of very fragmented networks turns out to be pair- 
wise stable in the mixed case where transferable information al va- 
lue also plays a role. Specifically, even with a slightly above zero, 
regular communi cation networks are never pairwise stable and 
also the example networks in Figs. 2 and 3 are not stable anymore. 
This may seem counter-i ntuitive, since apparently transferabil- 
ity of informat ional value causes networks to become more frag- 
mented and therefore less able to transfer informat ion. The 
intuition for this fragmentation is as follows. When information al 
value is absent, in a pairwise stable network an agent receives an 
equal amount of payoff from each of her links and therefore has 
no incentives to reduce the number of links. This is highly 
inefficient because of the negative externaliti es caused by high link 9 The results in the case where the value derived from communication is only 
info rm atio nal (a = 1) sl igh tly di ff er fro m tho se in thi s mi xe d ca se (0 < a < 1).
Specifically, in that case it holds that networks als o containing one four-agent star 
component can be pairwise stable. specificity. In the presence of informational value, agents do have 
incentives to break links, even if each link provides the same amount 
of informational value. Indeed, breaking a link with one of her neigh- 
bors in a cycle is beneficial to an agent, because it lowers the degree 
of that neighbor, leading to a higher informat ional value received 
from the other neighbor in the cycle. This argument shows that cy- 
cles will be absent, thereby eliminati ng many of the networks that 
were stable in the social value case. Networks without cycles are 
trees. Agents who are close to a leave of a tree have incentives to 
eliminate links with agents that are further away from the leaves. 
The reason is that high link specificity makes that the latter agents 
generate less informat ional value. This argument works for all trees 
with four or more nodes. In trees with three agents, leaves do not 
want to break a link in order not to become isolated. The center agent 
does not want to break a link, as both her neighbors are leaves, gen- 
erating the same informat ional value. 
Most studies reveal less fragmented stable networks, e.g., Goyal
and Vega-Redond o (2007) find large star networks in their setting 
of structural holes. Therefore, our model can help to explain 
real-life phenomena like marriage and the evolvement of threads 
in online communities into strong reciprocal ties (as empirica lly 
observed by Fisher et al., 2006 ).
3.3. Stable networks under low link specificity
For q = 1/2, we prove that the complete communication net- 
work is pairwise stable by retracing that also with value transfer- 
ability it is never beneficial for an agent in the complete network 
to delete one of her links under this low level of link specificity.
Proposit ion 4. When q = 1/2 and 0 6 a 6 1, the complete commu- 
nication network is pairwise stable. Proof. See Appendix A. h
The following example illustrates that already at relatively low 
a, multi-comp onent communication networks (cf. Proposition 2 for
a = 0) are not pairwise stable anymore .
Example 4. Assume q = 1/2 and consider the communication 
network in Fig. 4. When a = 0, the payoff for agent i is Vs and if 









ÞV s  0:99578Vs. When a = 1, the payoff for i is Vi













ÞV i  1:65733V i. When 0 < a < 1, the payoff for i is
aVi + (1  a)Vs and with a link to k would become 
1:65733aV i þ 0:99578ð1 aÞV s;
which for Vi = Vs exceeds the current payoff if a > 0.0064. Since k is
willing to create a link with i for any a, it holds that this network is 
not pairwise stable when a > 0.0064. 4. Efficiency
In this section, the structural results from the previous sections 
are assessed by their impact on efficiency. We define the efficiency
Fig. 4. A communication network that is pairwise stable when q = 1/2 and a = 0. 
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that the fragmented stable communica tion networks under high link 
specificity as well as the dense stable commu nication networks under 
low link specificity can be efficient in their own setting. Therefore, 
although not all pairwise stable commu nication netwo rks found for 
q = 1 and q = 1/2 are efficient, we conclude in contrast to Jackson
and Wolinsky (1996), that stabilit y and efficiency are compatibl e. 





PiðgÞ:Definition 4 (efficiency). The network g is efficient if it holds that 
WðgÞP Wðg0Þ for all g0:
We conjecture that for q = 1/2, the densification that characterizes
the pairwise stable communication networks has a generally beneficial
influence on welfare, as well as that for q = 1, the fragmentation that
characterizes the pairwise stable communication networks whenever
a > 0 has a generally beneficial influence on welfare. 11Conjecture 1. 
(i) When q = 1 and n is even, a communicati on network consisting 
of disjoint pair componen ts is efficient, and when q = 1 and n is 
odd, a communication network consisting of one three-agent line 
component and furthermore disjoint pair components is efficient.
(ii) When q = 1/2, the complete communicati on network is efficient.
For tractability, we prove the conjecture for low n and for 
the class of communicati on networks having only complete 
components.
Proposition 5. Conjectur e 1 holds when n = 3, 4, 5, or 6. Proof. Table 1 in the Supplement ary material (Appendix B) lists 
the normalized welfare for a = 1 and a = 0 at q = 1/2 and q = 1 for 
all possible communi cation networks when n = 3, 4, 5, and 6, 
ordered according to their welfare level at a = 1, q = 1/2. Given 
the linear combinati on in Eq. (5), the conjecture is hereby proven 
for all 0 6 a 6 1 and n = 3, 4, 5, or 6. h
Proposition 5 shows that a three-player line is at least as efficient as
a two-player line plus a singleton. For q = 1 and a = 0 it is easily com-
puted that the players in a two-player line each get a payoff of 1, and
the singleton player gets 0. The center agent in a three-player line ob-
tains 1 and the other two players 1/2, which leads to the same welfare.10 Alternatively, it may be intere sting to study the structural effects on the actual 
amount of information exchanged, thus disregarding the value derived from social 
aspects of communication. 
11 For a = 0, pairwise stable communication networks tend to be overconnected, cf. 
Morrill (2011) and Section 5.In the presence of informational value a > 0, the three-player line has
strictly higher welfare due to the indirect transfers of informational va-
lue which are now possible. In the presence of lower link specificity,
q < 1, the three-player line has strictly higher welfare as well. 
Proposit ion 6. Consider the class of communication networks con- 
sisting of fully connected components c1, . . . , ck. With mcj the number 
of members of cj, the following holds. 
(i) When q = 1/2, g is efficient in this class when k = 1 and mc1 ¼ n,
so g is complete. 
(ii) When q = 1 and n is even, g is efficient when k = n/2 and 
mcj ¼ 2 for all j, so g consists of disjoint pairs. 
12Proof. Because of symmetry in a complete component it suffices
to consider the payoffs for one member and because of the linear 
combinati on in Eq. (5) it suffices to consider the cases a = 0 and 
a = 1. 
(i) For q = 1/2 and a = 0, the normalized payoff for an agent in 
component cj is 0 when mcj ¼ 1 and 1 when mcj P 2. For 
q = 1/2 and a = 1, the normalized payoff for an agent in compo- 













mcj  1when mcj P 3, which is 3/2 for mcj ¼ 3 and increasing in mcj .
(ii) For q = 1 and a = 0, the normalized payoff for an agent in com- 
ponent cj is 0 when mcj ¼ 1 and 1=ðmcj  1Þ when mcj P 2,
which is 1 for mcj ¼ 2 and decreasing in mcj . For q = 1 and 
a = 1, the normalized payoff for an agent in component cj is 0


















when mcj P 3, which is 5/8 for mcj ¼ 3 and decreasing in mcj . h
5. Other values of link specificity
In this section, other link specificity values than 1 and 1/2 are 
investiga ted by simulations of our communicati on network forma- 
tion model. Because of the wide variety of possible pairwise stable 
and efficient networks for each q value (cf. Sections 2–4), simula- 
tions are considered to be a pragmatic tool to provide insight into 
effects of gradual changes in q. They illustrate that 1 and 1/2 are 
indeed suitable polar cases and that for intermediate values the 
common tension between stability and efficiency (e.g., Jackson
and Wolinsky, 1996 ) is re-establish ed. 
5.1. Method 
5.1.1. Pairwise stability 
A simulation starts with a randomly generated network, where 
for every i, j 2 N with i – j, the link gi,j is formed with probabili ty 
1/2.
In every iteration we randomly determine whether there will be 
an attempt to delete or create a link. If this turns out to be delete, 
one agent is drawn from the communi ty and subsequent ly another 
one. If there exists a link between these two agents, the first agent ice that for odd n, the most efficient communication network as predicted by 
ure 1 includes a component that is not complete. 
Table 2
Simulated effect of q on density of pairwise stable and pairwise efficient commu- 
nication networks for n = 6 and a = 0, 1/2, 1. 
qna 0 1=2 1
pws pwe pws pwe pws pwe 
0.1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
0.2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
0.3 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
0.4 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
0.5 1.00 0.58 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
0.6 1.00 0.22 1.00 0.43 1.00 0.52 
0.7 0.95 0.22 1.00 0.25 1.00 0.40 
0.8 0.70 0.23 0.69 0.23 0.54 0.22 
0.9 0.38 0.23 0.37 0.24 0.36 0.24 
1.0 0.27 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.24 
1.1 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.23 0.20 0.24 
1.2 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.23 
1.3 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 
1.4 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 
1.5 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 
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(5)). If this is strictly higher than the payoff she earns with the cur- 
rent network, the link is deleted. If no link exists between the two 
agents or the first agent does not gain by its deletion, the current 
network is maintained until the next iteration. 
If the attempt appears to be create, two agents are randomly 
drawn from the community. If no link exists between these two 
agents, they both calculate the payoff they will earn when they cre- 
ate such a link. If this is weakly higher for both agents and strictly 
higher for at least one of them, the link is created. If there already 
exists a link between these two agents or one of them loses or none 
of them gains by its creation, the current network is maintained .
In this way, 5000 iteration s are performed consecutive ly. After- 
wards it is verified whether the simulation converged to a pairwise 
stable network. We perform 500 of these simulations for each of 45 
specifications of paramete r values, with q equal to 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 1.5 
and a equal to 0, 1/2, 1. 
5.1.2. Pairwise efficiency
We also perform simulations to compute pairwise efficient
communicati on networks. This is achieved by repeating the proce- 
dure of Section 5.1.1, assuming that agents all hold welfare as their 
objective function (Definition 3). A network is said to be pairwise 
efficient if no pair of agents can improve welfare. 
Definition 5 (pairwise efficiency). The network g is pairwise effi-
cient if for all i, j 2 N with gi,j = 1 it holds that 13 Thus, for a = 0 the simulation process on average selects relatively sparse 
networks from the wide range of pairwise stable networks. WðgÞP Wðg0Þ;
where g0 is such that g0i;j ¼ 0 and g0k;l ¼ gk;l for all fk; lg – fi; jg, and 
for all i, j 2 N with gi,j = 0 it holds that 
WðgÞP Wðg0Þ;
where g0 is such that g0i;j ¼ 1 and g0k;l ¼ gk;l for all {k, l} – {i, j}.
Clearly, an efficient network is pairwise efficient, though the re- 
verse is not necessar ily the case. 
5.1.3. Further specifications
Community size n = 6 is chosen for all simulations, since it is 
large enough to illustrate interesting tendencies as well as small 
enough to generate reasonabl e calculatio n times regarding the 
exponential ly increasing number of paths in the payoff function 
(Eq. (5)). Furthermore, we take Vi = Vs = 6 because of symmetry 
and since values of 6 are convenient when computing the payoffs 
in specific examples . We have verified that our results are robust 
for the case with an odd number of agents n = 5. 
In order to compare simulatio n outcomes among levels of q and











For example, the empty network has density 0, a network consistin g
of three disjoint pair components has density 0.2, a network con- 
sisting of two disjoint three-agen t line components has density 
0.27, a network consisting of a four-ag ent wheel component and a
disjoint pair component or a network consistin g of a three-agent 
complet e component and a disjoint three-a gent line component 
has density 0.33, a wheel network or a network consistin g of two 
disjoint complete three-agent component s has density 0.4, a net- 
work consisting of a complete four-ag ent component and a disjoint 
pair component has density 0.47, a regular network with degree 3
has density 0.6, a regular network with degree 4 has density 0.8, 
and the complet e network has density 1. Our intuitive predictio n is that in general, a higher level of link 
specificity q makes communication more costly, and therefore the 
density of a simulated communicati on network lower. This intui- 
tion is confirmed by the analytically found potential outcome s
for the cases q = 1 and q = 1/2 (Sections 2 and 3). A higher level 
of focus on information al value a provides more value spillovers 
from indirect links, and thus the expected density of a pairwise sta- 
ble communi cation network is higher. As noted at the end of Sec- 
tion 3.2, this intuition is not confirmed by the analytica lly found 
potential outcome s: whereas in Section 2.2 a large range of possi- 
bly dense communication networks is proven to be pairwise stable 
for q = 1 and a = 0, in Section 3.2 only very fragmented communi -
cation networks turn out to be pairwise stable for q = 1 and a = 1. 5.2. Results 
It appears that all 500 simulatio ns in every setting converge to 
pairwise stable networks as described in Section 5.1.1. Therefore, 
we deal with density and welfare of these networks. 5.2.1. Density 
For each combination of 15 levels of link specificity q and three 
levels of focus on informational versus social value from communi- 
cation a, the average density of the 500 simulated pairwise stable 
and pairwise efficient networks is given in Table 2 and represented 
in Fig. 5.
The basic intuition about the effect of q on density in commu- 
nication networks is thus confirmed by the simulation outcome s
as it was by the analytical results of Sections 2 and 3, as the density 
of the pairwise stable networks is generally decreasing in q. Notice 
that this also roughly holds for the pairwise efficiency simulation 
outcome s, although a few small exceptions appear, for example 
at q = 0.8. 
The intuition about the effect of a on density in communi cation 
networks is again contradicted by the simulation outcomes, e.g., 
for q = 0.8 we find a higher average density for a = 1/2 (0.69) than 
for a = 1 (0.54), and for q = 1.0 we find a higher average density for 
a = 0 (0.27) than for a = 1/2 (0.23).13 Notice that our intuition about 
the effect of a on density in communica tion networks is still con- 
firmed by the pairwise efficiency simulat ion outcomes, in particular 
for q around 0.6. 
Fig. 5. Simulated effect of q on density of pairwise stable and efficient communication networks for n = 6 and a = 0, 0.5, 1. 
Table 3
Example of simulated communication networks. 
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lar cases, since outside these boundaries the simulated pairwise 
stable as well as efficient communicati on networks largely coin- 
cide with either the complete network or rather a network consist- 
ing of pairs only, whereas in between we find large differences in 
density between the pairwise efficient and pairwise stable commu- 
nication networks, where pairwise stable networks are more con- 
nected than pairwise efficient networks . Thus, for intermediate 
levels of q, the pairwise stable communi cation networks are highly 
connected as with lower levels of link specificity, whereas the pair- 
wise efficient communicati on networks are very fragmented as 
with higher levels of link specificity. The following example elabo- 
rates such a case. 
Example 5. Let q = 3/4, a = 1/2. Table 3 provides an overview of 
the types and numbers of pairwise stable communicati on net- 
works resulting from 100 simulations and the types and numbers 
of pairwise efficient communication networks resulting from 
another 100 simulatio ns. 
5.2.2. Efficiency
As a means to investigate to what extent the density differences 
between the pairwise efficient and pairwise stable communicati on 
networks actually lead to welfare differences, the average welfare 
provided by the 500 simulated pairwise stable and pairwise effi-
cient networks is given in Table 4 and represented in Fig. 6 for each 
parameter setting. For comparison, the expected welfare from a
random network 14 and the maximum welfare have also been calcu- 
lated for each setting. 
Although we have seen in Section 5.2.1 that a higher a and thus 
more value transferabili ty does not always lead to more dense 
communicati on networks, it apparently does always lead to higher 14 This was based on 5000 networks generated in the same way as the start 
networks for the simulations. welfare, as the welfare of the pairwise stable networks is increas- 
ing in a, even strictly so for q 6 1.0.15
Furthermore, though a lower q has been shown to lead to high- 
er density in communicati on networks, it only leads to subsequent 
higher welfare when link specificity is low enough, since for inter- 
mediate values of q, welfare is much lower and partly even strictly 
increases in q. Thus, the welfare of a community is higher for low 
and high values of q than for intermediate ones. 
Moreove r, we find that the density difference between pairwise 
stability and pairwise efficiency in communi cation networks found 
for a = 0, q = 0.5 does not lead to a subsequent welfare difference, 
but for intermediate levels of link specificity (1/2 < q < 1), the ten- 
sion between pairwise efficiency and pairwise stability is consider- 
able (up to larger than 40% for a = 0 and q = 0.7, 0.8). In the most 
extreme intervals (i.e., around q = 0.7), the simulated pairwise sta- 
ble networks on average even provide less welfare than a random 
network. Note that this effect is due to overconnecti on of the type 
illustrate d in Table 3.
Interestin gly, on the other hand a few parameter combinations 
exist where social preferences appear to be harmful for welfare in 
the sense that the simulated pairwise efficient communication net- 
works are not globally optimal, whereas pairwise stability does 
lead to maximum welfare (a = 1/2, q = 1.1 and a = 1, q = 1.1, 1.2).
Most of this is due to situations where the centers of two three- 
agent line components do not want to delete one of their links, 
because this would in the first instance harm welfare, whereas 
pairwise stability would lead both of them to delete one of their 
links, after which the two isolated agents can form a new pair, 
which increases welfare in the second instance. 6. Discussion 
This paper has shown that the structure of bilateral communi- 
cation links within communication networks can be appropriate ly 
studied using a model based on the game-theoretic literature of so- 
cial and economic network formation. A combinati on of important 
aspects common to communicati on networks was incorporate d
that had not been investigated until now: the negative externality 
of link specificity, which was neglected in the communication net- 
work context so far, and the positive externality of information al 
value transferability. 
In the case of communication having nontransferable social va- 
lue only (Section 2), illustrating the separate impact of link speci- 
ficity on structure, the set of pairwise stable communi cation 15 Notice that this claim does depend on the assumption Vi = Vs chosen for the 
simulations. For example, it can be shown that for q = 1 and Vs = xVi, a has an opposite 
effect on efficiency if x > 5/4. 
Table 4
Simulated effect of q on welfare of pairwise stable, pairwise efficient, random, and optimal communication networks for n = 6 and a = 0, 1/2, 1. 
qna 0 1/2 1
pws pwe rand max pws pwe rand max pws pwe rand max 
0.1 130.5 130.5 73.4 130.5 1758.8 1758.8 274.3 1758.8 3387.2 3387.2 471.8 3387.2 
0.2 94.6 94.6 59.9 94.6 601.3 601.3 160.3 601.3 1108.1 1108.1 258.8 1108.1 
0.3 68.5 68.5 49.1 68.5 243.0 243.0 101.8 243.0 417.4 417.4 154.3 417.4 
0.4 49.7 49.7 40.4 49.7 115.8 115.8 70.0 115.8 181.8 181.8 99.2 181.8 
0.5 36.0 35.9 33.4 36.0 63.2 63.2 50.4 63.2 90.4 90.4 67.3 90.4 
0.6 26.1 34.8 27.6 36.0 38.0 42.6 37.8 43.0 50.0 54.6 48.0 55.4 
0.7 19.7 34.5 23.0 36.0 24.5 35.9 29.3 36.0 29.9 43.6 35.7 43.6 
0.8 19.3 32.2 19.2 36.0 22.1 33.8 23.2 36.0 30.1 35.7 27.2 36.0 
0.9 23.9 31.6 16.1 36.0 26.8 32.0 18.7 36.0 30.0 33.6 21.3 36.0 
1.0 29.2 30.2 13.5 36.0 32.3 31.0 15.2 36.0 32.9 32.2 17.0 36.0 
1.1 36.0 36.0 11.5 36.0 36.0 31.3 12.5 36.0 36.0 31.1 13.7 36.0 
1.2 36.0 36.0 9.7 36.0 36.0 36.0 10.5 36.0 36.0 31.8 11.2 36.0 
1.3 36.0 36.0 8.3 36.0 36.0 36.0 8.8 36.0 36.0 36.0 9.4 36.0 
1.4 36.0 36.0 7.1 36.0 36.0 36.0 7.5 36.0 36.0 36.0 7.9 36.0 
1.5 36.0 36.0 6.1 36.0 36.0 36.0 6.4 36.0 36.0 36.0 6.7 36.0 
Fig. 6. Simulated effect of q on welfare of pairwise stable, pairwise efficient, random, and optimal communication networks for n = 6 and a = 0, 0.5, 1. 
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include a wide range of non-standar d networks like highly con- 
nected and ‘‘small world’’ networks, whereas previous models for 
social and economic network formatio n without agent heterogene- 
ity mostly predicted simple networks like stars and wheels. For 
low link specificity, particular combinations of fully connected 
components were proven to be pairwise stable communi cation 
networks in line with the co-author model of Jackson and Wolin- 
sky (1996).
In the case of communicati on from which both social and 
information al value is derived (Section 3), illustrating the joint 
impact of link specificity and value transferability on structure ,
under high link specificity only networks that consist of disjoint 
line components of two or three agents were shown to be 
pairwise stable. Herewith, we predict much more fragmentation 
than usually in the literature about social and economic network 
formation, where mostly only either of these two features was 
included. Under low link specificity, the opposite extreme effect 
takes place: already with small informational value transfera bil- 
ity, multi-com ponent communi cation networks may fail to be 
pairwise stable. Both the fragmentation under high link specificity and the 
dense pairwise stable communication networks under low link 
specificity are efficient in their own setting (Section 4), whereas 
for intermediate link specificity values quite inefficient communi -
cation networks may arise (Section 5).
Intuition predicts that a higher level of link specificity q makes
communi cation more costly, and therefore stable communication 
networks will be sparser. This is confirmed by the analytical results 
for the cases q = 1 and q = 1/2 (Sections 2 and 3) as well as by the 
simulatio n outcome s for other q values (Section 5). However, low- 
er link specificity and thus higher density only leads to subsequent 
higher welfare when link specificity is low enough, since for inter- 
mediate values of q, welfare is much lower (Section 5). This is 
caused by the fact that from a welfare point of view pairwise stable 
networks are too dense for intermedi ate values of q and the nega- 
tive externalities associated to link specificity. This implies that 
enhancing communicati on in the community by decreasing link 
specificity from a high to an intermedi ate level results in lower
welfare from communication. These results suggest that communi -
ties should either go for low link specificity or for high link speci- 
ficity in their communication efforts. Notice that link specificity
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choice of communication technolo gy and (in-)formal rules of con- 
duct such as bureaucratic hurdles and conventi ons on communica- 
tion style. 
A higher level of focus on transfera ble information al value a pro-
vides more positive value spillovers from indirect links, so intuition 
predicts higher density for pairwise stable communication net- 
works. This is contradicted by the analytical results for q = 1 (Sec-
tions 2 and 3) and to a smaller extent by the simulation outcomes 
for relatively high q values (Section 5), which can be ascribed to 
the interaction effect of value transferabili ty and high link specific-
ity. However , when the potential social and informat ional value 
present in a community are equal, higher a does always lead to high- 
er welfare, even strictly so for q 6 1.0 (Section 5). Therefore, stimu- 
lating the focus on information al value of communication can be a
generally effective tool for boosting welfare. In line with intuition, 
this effectivity is larger the smaller q.
Future studies could introduce agent heteroge neity, e.g., valua- 
tion heteroge neity in the sense that individua ls represent different 
values for their fellows or have different opinions on the values of 
their fellows, like Galeotti et al. (2006) for standard communica- 
tion network formatio n models. For example, when q = 1 and 
0 < a < 1, if we assume a valuation pattern deviating from full 
homogeneit y in the sense that there is one agent j who is valued 
differently than all other agents, it can be proven that all pairwise 
stable communication networks consist of small line components 
and one possibly larger component without cycles containing the 
differing agent j but not at the peripher y. In particular , this compo- 
nent may be a star component with agent j at the center. 
Another extension of the current model could be to relax the 
assumption that agents divide their available effort equally 
among all their relationship s, thus increasing the variability of 
link strength by dropping the common one-zero formulation of 
links. Bloch and Dutta (2009) started such a task mainly for a
setting with one-sided link formatio n and found rather similar re- 
sults as in their discrete variant. However , this similarity is partly 
ascribed to the assumption of a convex relationship between 
individual effort and link strength because of a fixed cost of link 
formation, whereas in our model a linear relationship would be 
more in line with the assumed costs of link maintenanc e rather 
than formation. 
Besides, a possible follow-up would be to empirically examine 
the applicability of the used payoff function in diverse contexts. 
The model could be tested experime ntally, contributing to an 
emerging literature as surveyed by Kosfeld (2004). Accordingly ,
we hope that our current work stimulates future research in the 
appealing area of communicati on networks and the roles of affect- 
ing link specificity as well as balancing nontransferabl e social and 
transferable informational value. 
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposit ion 3. () It is not beneficial for any of the 
periphery agents in a two- or three-agent line component to delete 
her single link as then her payoff will be zero. Equivalently, for the 
center agent in a three-agent line component, deleting a link with 
any of the two periphery agents is not beneficial as it will provide 
her with the same payoff. Lemma 1 implies that the periphery agents of a three-agent line 
do not create links. Therefore, we only have to examine the 
following cases (a) - (f) related to link formatio n between two 
agents in different components: Pair
agentCenter agent 
of 3-agent line Periphery agent 
of 3-agent line Pair agent (a) (b) (c)
Center agent of 
3-agent line 
x (d) (e)Periphery agent 
of 3-agent 
linex x (f)For each of these cases, it can be proven by evaluating the pay- 
offs with and without the link that no link is created: after forming 
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()) For this part of the proof, we need some extra notation. The 







where Ti,j(g) is the total payoff that j transfers to i via her direct link 
























Assume that g is a pairwise stable network. Let i be an agent in g
and k 2 Ni(g) be such that 
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j2NiðgÞ
Ti;jðgÞ:
Suppose that there exists an agent ‘ 2 Ni(g) for whom it holds that 
Ti;‘ðgÞ > Ti;kðgÞ:
Deleting the link between i and k results in network g0, where it 
holds that 
Ti;jðg0ÞP Ti;jðgÞ; 8j 2 Niðg0Þ;
since k, to whom j might be (in)directly linked, has one costly direct 
link less, so more informa tional value might flow from j to i via k.












which contradic ts pairwise stability of g. It follows that 
Ti;jðgÞ ¼ Ti;j0 ðgÞ; 8j; j0 2 NiðgÞ: ð6Þ
Next, suppose that g contains a cycle, meaning that there exists 
a sequence of distinct agents k1, . . . , kn 2 N for whom it holds that 
gk1 ;k2 ¼ gk2 ;k3 ¼    ¼ gkn1 ;kn ¼ gkn ;k1 ¼ 1. Let i be an agent in this 
cycle. Deleting the link with one of i’s neighbors in the cycle, say 
k, results in g0, where it holds for the other neighbor of i in the 
cycle, say m, that 
Ti;mðg0Þ > Ti;mðgÞ;
since k, to whom m is (in)directly linked, has one costly direct link 
less, so more information al value flows from k to i via m. Moreover, 
Ti;jðg0ÞP Ti;jðgÞ; 8j 2 Niðg0Þ:

















where the second equality follows from Eq. (6). This implies that g is
not pairwise stable, leading to a contradic tion. We have therefore 
shown that g does not contain any cycle. 
Since we have already shown that g contains no cycles, all 
components of g are trees. In a tree the number of links is one less 
than the number of agents. Moreover, in a tree there is a unique 
path between any two agents. A tree that is not a star contains an 
agent, say i, with a neighbor h that only has i as a neighbor, and, 
moreover, i is directly linked to an agent j who has another 
neighbor different from i. According to Eq. (6) it holds that 
Ti;hðgÞ ¼ Ti;jðgÞ: ð7Þ
Since h has only one neighbo r, i, it follows that 
Ti;hðgÞ ¼ aV i þ ð1 aÞV s:
We now evaluate Ti,j(g) and show it is smaller than Ti,h(g).
Think of the component NhðgÞ to which h belongs as a tree with 
h as top agent. For players k; k0 2 NhðgÞ, k – k0, player k0 is a
subordinate of k, denoted k0 2 SðkÞ, if k is on the unique path from h
to k0. Player k0 is a direct subordinate of k, denoted k0 2 S(k), if k0 is a
subordinate of k and there is a link between k and k0. We write 






















where pj,k is the unique path betwee n j and k.
Consider k 2 SðiÞ. We define the information al payoff that k







where T ik;k0 ðgÞ is defined analogous ly to T
i
i;jðgÞ. We obtain a recursive 
relatio n by noting that 
T ik;k0 ðgÞ ¼
V i þ Uik0 ðgÞ
lk0 ðgÞ
:
We show by induction that 
UikðgÞ 6 V
iðlkðgÞ  1Þ; ð9Þ
from which it follows that 
T ik;k0 ðgÞ 6




T ii;jðgÞ 6 V
i: ð10Þ
Let K0  NhðgÞ be the set of agents without subordinate s. For 
m P 1, let Km be the set of agents with all subordinate s in K0 -
[    [ Km1. Let m0 be the smallest integer for which j 2 Km0 . First 
consider an agent k in K0, the set of agents without subordinates. 
Then UikðgÞ ¼ 0 ¼ V
iðlkðgÞ  1Þ, so (9) is satisfied.
Suppose that (9) holds for agents in Km, m < m0. Consider an 











V i þ V iðlk0 ðgÞ  1Þ
lk0 ðgÞ
 !





V iðlkðgÞ  1Þ;
so (9) holds for all k 2 SðiÞ.
Combining (8) and (10) implies Ti,j(g) < Ti,h(g), a contradic tion to 
Eq. (7), so g consists of star components only. 
The proof of Lemma 1 implies that these stars have at most 
three agents. Stars of a single agent cannot be part of g, for it is 
always strictly beneficial for this single agent to create a link to the 
center agent of another star, whereas this center agent is indiffer- 
ent or improves if she is isolated too. ‘‘Stars’’ of two or three agents 
are lines. 
Proof of Proposition 4. We normalize payoffs by setting Vi = 1. For 






























where the first term combine s payoffs resulting from paths with 
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then the first term in (12) is given by Xn1
q¼3
aðqÞbðqÞ:
The second minus the third term in (12) is positive. We show by 
means of contradic tion that the first term is nonnegative . Suppose 
the first term is negative, implying n P 4.
Notice that a(q) P 0 and b(q) is decreasing in q, so there is q P 3
such that 3 6 q < q implies a(q)b(q) P 0 and q 6 q 6 n 1 implies 
















with k(3) = 1 by definition. Then we have obtained the desired con- 




n 1 n 3

















It holds that Xn1
q¼3
nq























































where for the third inequal ity we use the fact that 
12 þ 22 þ    þ r2 ¼ 13 r3 þ 12 r2 þ 16 r. After multiplyin g by 6 and 
rewriting we obtain the inequal ity 
3n3  12n2 þ 27n 30
n 1 







The expression on the left-hand side exceeds 
3n3  12n2 þ 27n 30
n 1 
3n4  17n3 þ 45n2  73nþ 54
ðn 1Þ n 85
 	 :Cross multiplyi ng, we find that the last expression is larger than or 
equal to zero if and only if 
3n4  16 4
5
n3 þ 46 1
5
n2  73 1
5
nþ 48
P 3n4  17n3 þ 45n2  73nþ 54:
For n P 4, such is clearly the case. Thus, the complet e network is 
pairwise stable for a = 1. 
Since it follows from Proposition 2 that the complete network is 
stable for a = 0 and given the linear combination in Eq. (5), the 
complete network is pairwise stable for 0 6 a 6 1.
Appendi x B. Supplementar y material 
Supplement ary data associated with this article can be found in 
the online version, at http://dx.doi .org/10.1016/j. ejor.2013.02 .028 .
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